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Executive control of attention refers to processes that detect and resolve conflict among
competing thoughts and actions. Despite the high-level nature of this faculty, the role of
awareness in executive control of attention is not well understood. In this study, we used
interocular suppression to mask the flankers in an arrow flanker task, in which the flankers
and the target arrow were presented simultaneously in order to elicit executive control of
attention. Participants were unable to detect the flanker arrows or to reliably identify their
direction when masked. There was a typical conflict effect (prolonged reaction time and
increased error rate under flanker-target incongruent condition compared to congruent
condition) when the flanker arrows were unmasked, while the conflict effect was absent
when the flanker arrows were masked with interocular suppression. These results suggest
that blocking awareness of competing stimuli with interocular suppression prevents the
involvement of executive control of attention.
Keywords: executive control of attention, continuous flash suppression, conflict effect, consciousness awareness,
flanker task

Introduction
Executive control of attention prioritizes goal-relevant information processing in the presence of
competing information or computations (Fan et al., 2002, 2005; Mackie et al., 2013). It has typically
been studied by manipulating stimulus and/or response conflict, as in various versions of Stroop
tasks (Stroop, 1935), Eriksen flanker tasks (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), and Simon tasks (Simon
and Berbaum, 1990). In these experiments, executive control of attention is elicited in the presence
of conflict. Relative to “congruent” stimuli, these “incongruent” stimuli are usually accompanied
by increased response times (RTs) and decreased accuracy. This difference in behavior between
incongruent and congruent stimuli defines the conflict effect and is taken as an indication of
increased executive control of attention (Botvinick et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2003, 2007, 2008).
An important issue is the relationship between executive control of attention and conscious
awareness. Because mechanisms involved in the executive control of attention are typically thought
to operate in a top-down manner, classical theories propose it to be exclusive to the domain of
conscious cognition (Posner and DiGirolamo, 1998; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Jack and Shallice,
2001). This is in contrast with automatic processing, which is assumed to necessarily occur outside
of conscious awareness. However, in the context of a body of inconsistent previous findings, whether
or not conscious awareness is necessary to elicit executive control of attention is still under debate
(Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012; Kiefer, 2012; Kunde et al., 2012; van Gaal et al., 2012; Ansorge
et al., 2014; Sterzer et al., 2014).

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

1

August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1110

Wu et al.

Visual awareness and executive control

Unconscious influence of executive control of attention has
primarily been investigated with subliminal sequential paradigms
where a masked priming stimulus is briefly presented before
a target stimulus (e.g., Klotz and Wolff, 1995; Naccache and
Dehaene, 2001; Klapp, 2007). Although the prime is masked
and thus phenomenally outside of awareness, responses to the
target have been shown to be facilitated by congruent primes
and hindered by incongruent primes, presumably demonstrating
that visual awareness is unnecessary for executive control.
Alternatively, this form of conflict can be conceived as automatic
activation of motor responses by unconsciously registered primes
(stimulus–response mappings), provided that action planning
has already occurred (Ansorge et al., 2002, 2014; Ansorge
and Neumann, 2005; Kiesel et al., 2007; Kunde et al., 2012).
Specifically, humans set up “action triggers” that connect relevant
target stimuli with respective motor responses in advance of
stimulus presentation (Kunde, 2003). A masked prime that is akin
to an action trigger can automatically initiate the corresponding
response in the absence of intentional control, even though
the prime remains below the threshold of awareness. Thus,
the effectiveness of subliminal priming stimuli in sequential
paradigms could reflect bottom-up response activation rather
than top-down executive control.
In contrast, simultaneous presentation of target and flankers
resulting in stimulus and response conflict has been theorized to
elicit mechanisms of control in a top-down manner. According to
an information theory account of executive control of attention,
the conflict effect is attributed to an increase in information
uncertainty associated with the target (Fan, 2014; Fan et al.,
2014), and is susceptible to top-down influences on ongoing
or completed stimulus processing. For example, in flanker
tasks, arrows pointing in the same direction can be grouped
together. The incongruent condition induces an additional
possible response relative to the congruent condition, and thus
increases the uncertainty level associated with the central target.
This uncertainty increase triggers executive control of attention
to resolve the ongoing conflict from the flankers in order to
prioritize goal-related target processing. Thus, the effectiveness
of competing information to elicit conflict in a simultaneous
paradigm reflects intentional detection and resolution of the
conflict among responses. It is still unknown, however, whether
conscious awareness is required for executive control of attention
when conflicting information and target stimulus are presented
concurrently.
The most commonly used technique to render stimuli invisible
is backward masking, in which the visibility of a very brief
stimulus is degraded by the presentation of a succeeding visual
pattern (Breitmeyer and Öğmen, 2006). Backward masking is
only effective at rendering a priming stimulus invisible for a very
brief (i.e., tens of milliseconds) duration (Macknik, 2006), which
is much shorter than the duration in typical flanker tasks (at
least hundreds of milliseconds) where flankers and the target
arrow are presented simultaneously (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974;
Fan et al., 2002). A more powerful technique to interfere with
awareness of the visual input is interocular suppression (i.e.,
continuous flash suppression, CFS), where a temporally dynamic
high-contrast image sequence presented to one eye degrades
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the visibility of a stimulus presented to the other eye (Fang
and He, 2005; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Because interocular
suppression allows for extended periods (seconds, rather than
milliseconds) of invisibility and unawareness of stimuli (Shimaoka
and Kaneko, 2011; Stein and Sterzer, 2011), it is an ideal
method to investigate the role of conscious awareness in highlevel cognitive operations that are assumed to require relatively
long processing times (Peremen and Lamy, 2014; Yang et al.,
2014).
Additionally, several lines of research have investigated the
variability of depth of non-conscious processing with different
techniques (Izatt et al., 2014; Peremen and Lamy, 2014). For
example, non-conscious processing of a target stimulus could
be enhanced by relevant primes that are made invisible because
of visual masking (i.e., backward masking) or near-threshold
presentation (Naccache and Dehaene, 2001; Naccache et al.,
2002). However, visual adaptation effects have been eliminated,
or at least substantially reduced, during interocular suppression
(Moradi et al., 2005; Blake et al., 2006). These results suggest that
interocular suppression possibly interrupts registration of stimuli
at an early stage of visual processing, while visual masking would
allow partial read-out of information, although without subjective
awareness. Although it is evident that conflict information
suppressed by visual masking can influence responses to the target
(for alternative explanations, see Van den Bussche et al., 2009;
Peremen and Lamy, 2014), it still important to know whether this
type of executive control of attention elicited by a simultaneous
paradigm can occur during interocular suppression.
In this study, we aimed to address this question specifically.
We hypothesized that executive control of attention is a topdown conscious process that operates only on information that
has reached higher-level processing. If this is true, it implies
that awareness of stimuli is necessary to elicit executive control
of attention. In two experiments, we used CFS to mask the
flanker arrows via two different manipulations of target-flanker
eye presentation. We predicted that when masking was absent,
we would obtain the conflict effect: incongruent flankers should
lead to prolonged RTs and lower accuracy compared to congruent
flankers; however, the conflict effect would be absent when
masking was present.

Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty individuals participated in Experiment 1, and 31
individuals participated in Experiment 2. The participants were
recruited from the Psychology 101 subject pool at Queens College
of the City University of New York (CUNY) and given class
credit for their participation. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and signed informed consent forms
prior to the start of the experimental procedure. The experiments
were approved by the Institutional Review Board of CUNY and
were run in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical
Association Declaration of Helsinki.
Participant’s data were excluded from further analysis if they
failed to respond to less than 80% of trials, or on the basis
of an additional experimental run that probed the effectiveness
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FIGURE 1 | The sequence of stimuli in each trial from Experiment 1
(A) and Experiment 2 (B). Each sequence shows an example of the
images presented when the target was in the right eye. The left panels
(no masking) show conditions where the flanker arrows were not masked,
and the right panels (masking) show conditions where the flanker arrows
were masked by CFS. (A) CFS was present on all trials; by presenting the
flanker arrows to the opposite eye from the target arrow and the

Mondrians, the CFS masked awareness of the flankers. (B) Flanker and
target arrows were always presented to different eyes. The presence of
the Mondrians in the same eye as the target masked awareness of the
flankers. The incongruent condition (with flankers pointing to the opposite
direction as the target) is shown in (A) and (B). For the congruent
condition, the flankers point in the same direction as the target. For the
no-flanker condition, there are no flankers displayed.

of the CFS mask (see Procedure below). Based on these
exclusion criteria, the final sample consisted of 28 participants in
Experiment 1 (10 females, mean age ± SD, 21.43 ± 5.75 years)
and 19 participants in Experiment 2 (10 females, mean age ± SD,
21.16 ± 3.70 years).

the same eye or to different eyes. To facilitate the fusing of the two
images, a thin outer square border of alternating black and white
bands was presented to both eyes throughout the experiment. In
addition, a central fixation cross was presented to both eyes for the
duration of the experiment.
In Experiment 1 (Figure 1A), a CFS mask was present on
every trial. The mask consisted of a large set of Mondrian
images—random colored overlapping ovals that filled the space
inside the outer square border (modeled after the CFS masker
in Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). The Mondrians were presented at
the rate of 10 Hz. Ovals were used to minimize the number of
sharp angles in the mask that could interfere with perceiving
the angles that define the arrows. The CFS mask was always
presented to the same eye as the target arrow. The flanker and

Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli are illustrated in Figure 1. Participants viewed a
central target arrow (approximately 2.8°) pointing either to the
left or right. It could be presented simultaneously with four
surrounding flanker arrows (approximately 2.8°). The arrows
(uncalibrated RGB values = 103) were presented at a low
contrast darker than the gray background (uncalibrated RGB
values = 128). The target and flanker arrows were presented to

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

3

August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1110

Wu et al.

Visual awareness and executive control

target arrows could be presented to the same eye, or to different
eyes. In Experiment 2 (Figure 1B), the CFS mask was presented on
50% of the trials, and was always presented to the same eye as the
target arrow. The flanker and target arrows were always presented
to different eyes.
A stereoscopic goggle system (ELSA wired 3D goggles with
attached head-strap) was used to display the stimuli. The goggle
system allowed independent presentation of stimuli to each eye.
The screen resolution for each eyepiece was 800 × 600 pixels.
Viewing distance to each eyepiece was approximately 2.5 cm. The
stimuli were presented using MATLAB (2010b, The MathWorks,
Inc.) and routines from the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3
(Brainard, 1997) on a Mac Pro 5.1 computer (OSX 10.7) with
an ATI Radeon HD 5770 GPU. The computer generated visual
output at 60 Hz, and each eyepiece received alternating frames of
this output at 30 Hz. One eyepiece received the even frames while
the other received the odd frames.

change on the screen, and only the fixation cross was visible). Then
the target arrow, as well as the CFS mask and flanker arrows (if
present), appeared for 1200 ms. When the CFS mask was present,
it remained on the screen for 500 ms after the offset of the arrows
while the fixation cross remained visible in the other eyepiece.
On trials where the CFS mask was absent, the fixation cross
was seen in both eyepieces for the same duration (500 ms). The
continuing presentation of the CFS mask after the target arrow
presentation ensured that the flanker arrow’s afterimage did not
influence responses. Responses could be recorded at any time up
to this point. The fixation cross remained on the screen for the
remaining time until the total 4 s trial duration ended.
A fifth run was included to assess whether the flanker arrows
were visible despite the presence of the CFS mask. The stimuli in
this fifth run were identical to those in the other four runs of the
experiment, with the addition of two questions after every trial.
Participants were instructed to ignore the target arrow for the fifth
run, and to instead watch for the flanker arrows and to respond to
the two question prompts. The first question asked whether the
flanker arrows pointed to the left or the right. This discrimination
question was presented after all trials, whether the flankers
were present or not. Participants were told to choose whichever
direction “felt right” if no flankers were seen. The second question,
presented immediately after the first question, asked whether or
not participants saw any flanker arrows. Participants were told to
respond “yes” to this one-interval yes/no (Y/N) question if they
believed they might have seen the flanker arrows.
In addition to excluding participants who responded to less
than 80% of trials, we also excluded participants on the basis
of their performance in the fifth run. The exclusion criteria
were: (1) responding to less than 80% of questions in the final
run, determined by checking the distributions of “percent with
responses made” and selecting the cutoff if the distribution was
binomial; (2) for the two discrimination and detection questions,
d′ outside ± 1.0, for trials when the flankers were masked. Note
that for calculating d′ of the first discrimination question, “right”
was arbitrarily defined as signal and “left” as noise. d′ is a measure
of detection sensitivity in the presence of noise, independent of
response bias (Green and Swets, 1966). It has been suggested
that with a d′ of 0 the individual cannot discriminate between
signal and noise, whereas a d′ of 1 suggests medium performance
and a d′ of 4.65 suggests optimal performance (Hortensius et al.,
2014). The negative value of d′ does not mean no sensitivity, but
rather can arise through sampling error or response confusion
(responding “yes” when intending respond “no,” and vice versa)
(Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). Given the possible confounding
of response confusion, the exclusion criterion of d′ < −1 was
also made.

Procedure
In both Experiments 1 and 2, the participants’ task was to indicate
whether the target arrow pointed to the left or right by means of
a keyboard button press. They were asked to respond as quickly
and accurately as possible, and to ignore any other non-target
arrows and colorful images. RT and accuracy were recorded by
the computer. On 1/3 of the trials, the target arrow was presented
alone (no-flanker condition), and on the other 2/3 of trials it was
presented with the flanker arrows. The direction of the flanker
arrows (always the same for all four arrows) was either the same
as the direction of the target arrow (congruent condition) or the
opposite (incongruent condition), 1/3 of trials for each.
The visibility of the flanker arrows was manipulated in two
different ways. In Experiment 1, the flanker arrows were made
invisible (masking condition) by presenting them to the opposite
eye from the CFS mask and target arrow. The flankers were made
visible by presenting them to the same eye as the mask and target
(no-masking condition). This manipulation is similar to that used
in CFS masking experiments (Kang et al., 2011; Yuval-Greenberg
and Heeger, 2013) where the visual noise is present on every trial
of the experiment. In Experiment 2, the CFS mask was present on
50% of the trials in the same eye as the target. Because the flanker
arrows were always presented to the opposite eye from the target
arrow, the flanker arrows were invisible when the CFS mask was
present. This mask manipulation is similar to the presence of a
backward mask in priming experiments (see also Fang and He,
2005), because the visual noise is only present during masking
trials.
The six conditions (three flanker conditions × two visibility
conditions) of each experiment were randomly presented an equal
number of times in each experimental run. The target arrow was
randomly presented to the left or right eye with equal probability.
Each experiment consisted of four runs, with 96 trials per run.
Each run began and ended with a 30 s fixation period, and each
trial lasted 4 s, for a total of 7.4 min per run. Participants were
given the option of taking a break after each run.
At the start of each trial, a fixation period was presented for a
random duration (800–1800 ms in Experiment 1, 200–1200 ms in
Experiment 2) in order to jitter the intertrial interval (there was no
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Results
All participants included in the final analysis could not reliably
identify the direction of the flankers on the first discrimination
question (mean accuracy ± 1 SD = 50% ± 5% in Experiment 1,
50% ± 9% in Experiment 2) when the flankers were masked, but
could easily perform this task when the flankers were not masked
(98% ± 3%, Experiment 1 and 2). Mean sensitivity (d′ ) on the

4

August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1110

Wu et al.

Visual awareness and executive control

FIGURE 2 | Behavioral data from Experiment 1 (A,B) and Experiment 2 (C,D). The mean RT data are plotted as a function of flanker condition in (A,C), and the
mean accuracy data is similarly plotted in (B, D). Error bars plot ± 1 standard error of the mean. No, No Flankers; Con, Congruent Flankers; Inc, Incongruent Flankers.

Y/N question was close to 0 (mean d′ ± 1 SD = −0.09 ± 0.37
in Experiment 1, −0.20 ± 0.25 in Experiment 2) for trials when
the flankers were masked.
The RT data from Experiment 1 are plotted as a function of
flanker condition in Figure 2A. The light gray and dark gray
bars represent data from the no-masking and masking conditions,
respectively. The main feature of the data is the difference in
pattern between the visibility conditions. RT varied as a function
of flanker condition for the no-masking condition, but not the
masking condition. This was confirmed by a repeated-measures
ANOVA with participant as a random effect and flanker and
visibility as fixed effects, which indicated a significant flanker by
visibility interaction [F(2,54) = 82.73, p ≤ 0.001]. Simple planned
comparisons confirmed that RT varied with flanker condition
for the no-masking condition [F(1,27) = 127.19, p ≤ 0.001],
but not the masking condition (F < 1). Unsurprisingly, there
was no significant difference in RT in the no-flanker conditions
[F(1,27) = 1.13, p = 0.30] because the visual stimuli were the
same on these conditions. The mean conflict effect for the nomasking condition was significantly different from 0 [mean RT
difference ± 1 SD = 63.50 ms ± 29.80 ms, t(27) = 11.28,
p < 0.001], but not for the masking condition [mean conflict
effect ± 1 SD = −1.21 ms ± 20.97 ms, t(27) = −0.31, p = 0.76].
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The accuracy data from Experiment 1 follow a similar pattern,
and are plotted as a function of flanker condition in Figure 2B.
A repeated-measures ANOVA with participant as a random effect
and flanker and visibility as fixed effects indicated a significant
flanker by visibility interaction [F(2,54) = 4.43, p = 0.02]. Simple
planned comparisons again confirmed that this interaction is
due to an effect of flanker condition on accuracy for the nomasking condition [F(1,27) = 9.00, p = 0.006] but not the
masking condition (F < 1). There was no significant difference
in accuracy between the no-flanker conditions (F < 1). The
mean conflict effect for the no-masking condition was again
significantly different from 0 [mean accuracy difference ± 1
SD = −1.2% ± 2.1%, t(27) = −3.00, p = 0.006], but not
for the masking condition [mean accuracy difference ± 1
SD = −0.1% ± 1.1%, t(27) = −0.27, p = 0.79].
The RT and accuracy data from Experiment 2 are plotted in
Figures 2C,D. The pattern of both measures is very similar to
the data in Experiment 1. For both RT and accuracy, repeatedmeasures ANOVAs with participant as a random effect and
flanker and visibility as fixed effects indicated a significant
flanker by visibility interaction [F(2,36) = 25.37, p ≤ 0.001 for
RT; F(2,36) = 5.02, p = 0.01 for accuracy]. Simple planned
comparisons demonstrated an effect of flanker condition when
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there was no masking [F(1,18) = 40.38, p ≤ 0.001 for RT;
F(1,18) = 8.92, p = 0.008 for accuracy], but failed to show an effect
of flanker condition when there was masking [F(1,18) = 1.83,
p = 0.19 for RT; F(1,18) = 2.03, p = 0.17 for accuracy]. In
addition, we did not find any significant differences between
the no-flanker conditions (F < 1 for both RT and accuracy).
The conflict effects were similar to those in Experiment 1. For
both RT and accuracy, the mean conflict effects in the nomasking conditions were significantly different from 0 [mean RT
difference ± 1 SD = 72.68 ms ± 49.87 ms, t(18) = 6.35, p < 0.001;
mean accuracy difference ± 1 SD = −2.7% ± 4.0%, t(18) = −2.99,
p = 0.008]. On the other hand, the mean conflict effects in
the masking conditions were indistinguishable from 0 [mean RT
difference ± 1 SD = 5.67 ms ± 18.30 ms, t(18) = 1.35, p = 0.19;
mean accuracy difference ± 1 SD = −0.4% ± 1.3%, t(18) = −1.42,
p = 0.17].
Across two experiments we showed non-significant conflict
effects under the masking condition, which may support our null
hypothesis that awareness and executive control of attention are
closely related. However, an alternative interpretation of these
non-significant results could be that the data are insensitive in
distinguishing the theory from the null hypothesis. In fact, a
non-significant p-value, no matter “how non-significant it is,”
does not distinguish evidence for the null from no evidence
at all (Royall, 1997). To assess whether the absence of conflict
effects under interocular suppression indicated evidence
for null or just insensitivity, we calculated Bayes factors (B)
to determine the relative strength of evidence for null and
alternative hypotheses (Dienes, 2008, 2014). The value of B
means that the data are B times more likely under the alternative
than under the null hypothesis. The conventional standard
for assessing substantial evidence for the null is a value of
B less than 1/3, while values between 1/3 and 3 are counted
as data insensitivity (Jeffreys, 1998). The Bayes factors were
calculated using free online Dienes (2008) Bayes calculator
(http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/ Zoltan_Dienes/ inference/
bayes_factor.swf) by specifying a uniform distribution with
all population parameter values from the lower to the upper
limit equally plausible. The upper limit was indicated by the
conflict effect under the no masking condition where the flankers
were consciously visible, while the lower limit was set with a
default of 0. In Experiment 1, the values of B for both RT and
accuracy were smaller than 1/3 (BU[0,64] = 0.06 for RT, and
BU[0,1.2] = 0.28 for accuracy), indicating substantial evidence
for the null hypothesis. In Experiment 2, the value of B for RT
was less than 1/3 (BU[0,73] = 0.33), which also supported the null
hypothesis. However, the value of B for accuracy was slightly
greater than 1/3 (BU[0,2.71] = 0.7), indicating a lack of sensitivity
of the accuracy measure. Overall, the results provide strong
evidence for the phenomenological absence of unconscious
processing.

performance as measured by RT or accuracy. In fact, performance
under masked conditions was indistinguishable from conditions
when no flankers were presented. These results suggested a
close relationship between executive control of attention and
conscious awareness. It should be noted that our findings
could not lead us conclude a necessary role of awareness in
executive control of attention. The absence of conflict effect
when the flanker arrows were masked from awareness could
be attributed to the deep suppression with CFS-like technique.
Specifically, that degraded the representation of the flankers to
an extent and thus abolished the measure of executive control of
attention.
We confirmed the effect of masking using both an objective
identification measure and a subjective detection measure. In
the additional fifth run, using stimuli identical to those in
the rest of the experiment, participants were asked to judge
the direction of the flankers and then subjectively report the
presence of the flankers. We showed that participants were unable
to identify the direction of flankers or detect their presence
under the masking condition. Although such demonstrations of
lack of awareness are common in masked priming experiments,
some care is warranted in interpreting these kinds of results
(Lau, 2008). Perceptual awareness is usually equated with
performance in sensitivity measures, particularly in forced-choice
discrimination/detection tasks, and unawareness is synonymous
with null sensitivity of the stimulus. It has been suggested,
however, that task performance provides an inconsistent measure
of conscious awareness, which should be compensated for with
subjective reports of seeing, guessing or rating the clarity of
conscious experience (Lau and Passingham, 2006; Sandberg et al.,
2010).
Classical theories propose that executive control of attention
is closely linked to conscious cognition (Posner, 1994; Velmans,
1996; O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Mole, 2008; De Brigard and Prinz,
2010). Studies have shown that in a prime-target task, the presence
of a conflict effect (between prime and target) on a given trial
as a function of conflict in the preceding trial occurs only when
the prime is visible but not masked, while there is no evidence
of such an effect when the prime is invisible in the preceding
trial (Kunde et al., 2003; Ansorge et al., 2011; Desender and
Van den Bussche, 2012). These studies suggest that conscious
experience of a preceding conflict effect is necessary to evoke
executive control for the subsequent trial. These studies aimed
to investigate the necessity of awareness for the adaptation effect
called the Gratton effect (Gratton et al., 1992). Because the prime
is presented earlier than the target, a sensorimotor activation
account is usually employed to explain the conflict effect,
especially when the prime and target are the same, compared
to when primes are different from the target (Fagioli et al.,
2007; Ansorge et al., 2011). In the present study, the flanker and
target were presented simultaneously, thus avoiding the potential
alternative explanation of sensorimotor activation. According to
an information theory account of executive control of attention,
the conflict could be due to an increase in information uncertainty
associated with the target (Fan, 2014). This uncertainty increase
triggers executive control of attention to resolve the ongoing
conflict from the flankers, in order to prioritize goal-related target

Discussion
Across two experiments, we demonstrated the presence of conflict
effects when the flankers were unmasked by CFS. When the
flanker arrows were masked, they had no significant effect on
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processing. Therefore, activation of stimulus–response mappings
cannot account for these results. In our experiment, the difference
between the masked and unmasked flanker conflict conditions
was whether or not there were interocular suppression that
masked the flankers out of awareness, consequently ruling out
several potential confounds present in previous studies, such
as differential time of presentation of masked and unmasked
stimuli.
Our results showed that the conflict effect elicited by
consciously perceived incongruent flankers was abolished when
the flankers were masked out of awareness, consistent with
the view that high-level cognitive processes only operate on
events of which we are aware (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001,
for an overview, see Jack and Shallice, 2001; Hommel, 2007).
In addition, it has been previously suggested that attention
may modulate processing of invisible stimuli (Naccache et al.,
2002; Bussche et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2014), with supporting
neuroimaging evidence in CFS-like paradigms (Bahrami et al.,
2007). Notably, however, in our study, the flankers (masked
or unmasked) were always presented in close proximity to the
target, and consequently, the attentional spotlight was directed
toward the masked stimuli for the entirety of the masked flanker
trials. We found no evidence to support the idea that masked
flanker processing was enhanced by attentional focus. These
results suggest that visual awareness and executive control of
attention are closely related. It should be noted, however, that
these results cannot lead us to conclude that consciousness
and attention are inseparable. There is evidence showing that
conscious awareness and visual attention are supported by
distinct neuronal mechanisms (Watanabe et al., 2011; Horga
and Maia, 2012). It has also been shown that some highlevel operations, under certain conditions, can be deployed
independently of visual awareness (Soto and Silvanto, 2014;
Jachs et al., 2015). For example, recent research has shown that
critical relevant information that goes undetected can permeate
to working memory and may enable non-conscious information
to be maintained and bias subsequent perceptual processing, and
engagement of prefrontal cortex (Soto et al., 2011; Dutta et al.,
2014; Pan et al., 2014).
In previous studies using subliminal sequential priming
paradigms, the prime is masked either by introducing noise
stimuli before and/or after the presentation of the prime, or by
manipulating the duration and timing of the prime (Cheesman
and Merikle, 1984; Dehaene et al., 1998; Heinemann et al., 2009;
Bahrami et al., 2010; Van Opstal et al., 2011). Because the prime is
presented with only a relatively short duration in these studies, the
priming effect might not reflect intentional top-down processes
that are relatively slow to develop (Mulckhuyse and Theeuwes,
2010). Unlike the backward masking technique that is effective
only when stimuli are presented very briefly (typically for less
than 100 ms), CFS-induced suppression that can last on the
order of seconds (Shimaoka and Kaneko, 2011). This makes it a
particularly well-suited technique to investigate the relationship
between conscious awareness and high-level cognitive processing,
which may require a relatively long processing time. There is
evidence to suggest that the masking effect of CFS is initially
weak, and increases with successive presentations, reaching
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its maximum effectiveness and plateauing after approximately
500 ms (Tsuchiya et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2014). In our study,
the target arrow and flankers were simultaneously presented
for 1200 ms, much longer than the typical durations of tens
to hundreds of milliseconds used in priming experiments. In
addition, this way of presenting stimuli was more similar to
those used in traditional executive control studies. Note that the
relatively long stimulus duration was not related to whether or
how unconscious processing happened. For example, it has been
shown in priming paradigms that primes with shorter durations
are more effective in eliciting unconscious processing (Barbot and
Kouider, 2012).
A more likely explanation of our results could be that the
complete lack of a conflict effect under the masking condition
is due to a deeper suppression of stimuli by CFS compared to
masked priming paradigms (Peremen and Lamy, 2014). It has
been argued that non-conscious influences of primes with short
presentation duration or backward masking may be attributed
to partial conscious perception (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007). In
contrast, CFS is a more effective masker that is assumed to have
its effects at an early stage and thus impede further high-level
processes (Yuval-Greenberg and Heeger, 2013). For example, a
number of studies have failed to obtain evidence for unconscious
processing of high-level information rendered invisible with CFS
(Moradi et al., 2005; Blake et al., 2006; Stein and Sterzer, 2011).
In our study, the absence of conflict effects during CFS in our
experiments is in line with previous findings that high-level visual
unconscious processing is comparably limited under interocular
suppression (Tong et al., 2006; Almeida et al., 2008; Lin and
He, 2009; Stein and Sterzer, 2014). It should be noted, however,
the deep suppression under CFS might be at risk of being too
deep, consequently leading to false-negative findings (Sterzer
et al., 2014). In fact, our results showed that performance under
masked conditions was indistinguishable from the condition
in which no flankers were presented, suggesting that CFS
substantially reduced the perceptual representation of flankers
and abolished the measure of executive control of attention.
In addition, the effectiveness of CFS masking was confirmed
with an additional procedure in which performance on the
discrimination/detection of flankers was assessed. This measure
might be too strict given that the strength of suppression varies
during CFS. For example, the stimulus contrast should be set
low enough to ensure that it would not break CFS for the
duration of the experiment. Thus, the absence of unconscious
processing could result from the use of the interocular suppression
technique of CFS, rather than abolishment of awareness. This
concern could possibly be addressed by collecting subjective
measures of awareness on a trial-by-trial basis, while comparing
performance on trials when the stimuli are fully suppressed
versus partially suppressed (Stein and Sterzer, 2011; Stein et al.,
2012).
Neuroimaging studies using backward masking paradigms
showed that activity in regions associated with executive control
appears to be attenuated when the incongruent prime stimulus
is masked. For example, one study showed activity in the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) during a priming task involving
a categorical determination of numbers greater or less than five
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(Dehaene et al., 2003). Although there was a non-zero behavioral
effect size when the prime was both masked and unmasked, ACC
activation related to prime-target conflict was present only when
the prime was unmasked. The behavioral pattern of our results
resembles this pattern of neural activity, and provides converging
evidence supporting the necessity of awareness of the stimuli
in executive control of attention. However, other studies found
ACC activation with unconscious conflict (Ursu et al., 2009),
and inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and pre-supplementary motor
area (pre-SMA) activation with backward masked no-go stimuli
(van Gaal et al., 2010). Further studies using reliable masking
techniques are required to clarify the neural bases of unconscious
stimuli processing.
Continuous flash suppression and backward masking may
fundamentally rely on different mechanisms of interference. The
effects of primes masked by both CFS and backward masking
have been shown to differ: unconscious priming effects are
restricted to a specific category of primes rendered invisible
with CFS, whereas the priming effects can be obtained across
a range of different categories of primes rendered invisible
through backward masking (Almeida et al., 2008). This finding
has led to the speculation that CFS and backward masking
might interfere with information passing through different neural
pathways (Almeida et al., 2013). CFS has been shown to
interfere with activity in early visual cortex (Yuval-Greenberg
and Heeger, 2013), and backward masking interferes with
activity in the superior colliculus and pulvinar (Dehaene et al.,
2001). The lowest contrast target rendered invisible by CFS
evoked V1 activity that was statistically indistinguishable from
the mask-only (no target) condition (Yuval-Greenberg and
Heeger, 2013). This interference is maintained through higher
regions in the visual pathway, (Fang and He, 2005; Tsuchiya
and Koch, 2005; Jiang et al., 2006; Watanabe et al., 2011).
By using CFS, we can attribute the lack of awareness in
our masking conditions to the obliteration of the information
of flanker arrows before passing through V1. Although CFS
seems to be an elegant way to suppress a stimulus without
changing its physical properties and has gained increasing
popularity for studying visual awareness (Fang and He, 2005;
Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; Jiang et al., 2006; Watanabe et al.,
2011), some care is warranted in using this technique. CFS
is based on affecting the gain of neural responses in early
visual cortex, which is akin to reducing stimulus contrast. By
changing the context in which the stimulus is presented, CFS
would degrade the representation of the masked stimulus and
suppress the stimulus more deeply compared to other visual
masking paradigms. An interesting possibility is to perform the
present experiments using a different form of masking, one that
selectively interferes with only regions further up in the visual
processing stream. In a technique referred as “chromatic flicker
fusion” (CFF), two isoluminant and opposing colored stimuli are
simultaneously presented to both eyes and flicker dramatically
in counter-phase with each other at a temporal frequency
above the flicker fusion threshold (∼30 Hz) (Hoshiyama et al.,
2006). Although CFS and CFF can render stimuli subjectively
invisible with supposedly comparable effectiveness, unconscious
information that never leaves the occipital lobe using CFS
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is decodable within temporal and frontal regions using CFF
(Fogelson et al., 2014). Thus, CFF may be a more sensitive
technique for measuring unconscious high-level processing
than CFS.
In considering the possibility of an effect of unconscious stimuli
on executive control of attention, our study has not addressed
whether invisible emotional or threatening stimuli can elicit
executive control of attention. There is reason to suspect that if
executive control of attention would act on unconscious stimuli,
it would do so for stimuli that have the greatest behavioral and
adaptive relevance (van Gaal et al., 2010; Ansorge et al., 2014).
The flexibility of top-down executive control of attention, for
example, notably includes the ability to shift attention between
goal-relevant stimuli and other stimuli in the environment that
grab attention in a bottom-up fashion (Fan, 2014). There is
some evidence to suggest that information from suppressed facial
stimuli is indeed processed (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Pasley et al.,
2004; Vuilleumier, 2005; Finkbeiner and Palermo, 2009; Smith,
2012), as well as information from stimuli that are temporally
surprising (McCormick, 1997; Mulckhuyse et al., 2007). While
the so-called “refined” theories of automaticity attribute flexibility
to unconscious processes as well (Kiefer, 2012), much further
work is required in this area in order to arrive at a viable
conclusion.
We conclude from this study that blocking awareness of
competing stimuli using interocular suppression prevents conflict
processing. Careful examination and a deeper understanding of
the mechanisms involved in masking stimuli from awareness is
necessary in order to fully understand the relationship between
executive control of attention and awareness.
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